This paper discusses the main elements of the present operation of the main food industries in the CEEC-5 from a structural point of view and places these elements in the context of EU membership. The main structural aspects addressed in the paper are i) privatisation and restructuring; ii) significance of foreign direct investment (FDI); and iii) market structure and conditions of competition. In analysing the results of privatisation, we attempt to link the method of privatisation and its potential effects on the future performance of the enterprises. One immediate impact of privatisation is whether it favours or deters FDI. The analysis of FDI in the food industry is an obvious element of such a paper since it is widely known, and already observed in the case of the countries in transition, that it profoundly affects the conduct and performance of the enterprises which receive it. The analysis of the industrial structures is meant to provide a guide to better predict the future performance of the enterprises of the CEEC-5 when immersed in the EU single market.
Introduction
This review focuses on the five Central and Eastern European countries which started to negotiate their EU membership in March 1998, i.e.: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (hereafter referred to together as the CEEC-5).
Here the agro-food sector is considered as industries processing agricultural products.
Therefore, we do not address other parts of the food chain such as agricultural production, wholesale and retail distribution. However, we do include beverages and tobacco products.
The objectives of the paper are to provide the main elements of the present context of operation of the main food industries in the CEEC-5 from a structural point of view and to put these elements into the context of EU membership. This paper is therefore of a descriptive nature and relies primarily on the growing literature published on the food industry in the CEECs. The paper also considers the main elements of performance of the food industries in the CEEC-5. The main structural aspects we have decided to study in this paper are i) privatisation and restructuring; ii) significance of foreign direct investment (FDI); and iii) market structure and conditions of competition. In analysing privatisation results, we have attempted to link the methods of privatisation and its potential effects on the future performance of the enterprises. One immediate impact of the technique of privatisation is whether it favours or deters FDI. An analysis of FDI in the food industry is an obvious element of such a paper since it is widely known, and already observed in the case of countries in transition, that it profoundly affects the conduct and performance of those enterprises that receive it. Finally, an analysis of the industrial structure is meant to provide a guide to better predict the future performance of the enterprises of the CEEC-5 when immersed in the EU single market.
As regards privatisation in the CEEC-5, we present the main features adopted without referring extensively to the reasons explaining the choices of the policy-makers. This would require a careful analysis of the political economy framework which is beyond the scope of the paper. However, it remains that such in-depth analysis is necessary to fully understand the main political decisions of the governments.
The second section of the paper addresses several aspects of the privatisation of the food industry: the actual results of privatisation, possible impacts of the method of privatisation on the potential performance of firms. The third section looks at the significance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the countries analysed. The next section deals with the industrial structure of the food industry and the conditions of competition. The fifth section uses the findings of the previous sections in order to derive some elements of reflection concerning the immersion of the food sectors of the CEEC-5 in the single market of the EU. In the last section, the main conclusions of the paper are presented.
When talking about the food industry in the CEEC-5, one has to take account of the differences across countries. As a matter of fact, the food industry's role in the economy of the CEEC-5 varies widely from country to country. It has minor significance in Slovenia and the Czech Republic but is a prominent sector in Estonia, Hungary and Poland. Estonia is an extreme case with the food industry peaking to 40% of total industrial value added. This probably reflects to some extent the past role of the country as a foodstuff supplier to the Soviet Union before transition (in the meat and milk sub-sectors). Source: Commission of the EU, quoted by Szabo (1997) .
Much has been said about the past poor performance of most food state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the transition. The reasons were straightforward: over-concentration of the food chain around a limited number of over-sized monopolies or oligopolies, absence of competition, limited role of price and cost considerations, disincentives for innovation, under-investment in most countries, interference by the administration, to list only the greatest stumbling blocks on the road to efficiency. Even in a country like Hungary, the food industry, which had acquired a leading role in exporting to Western European countries, was far from reaching Western standards. It only succeeded in exporting low processed products with pricing as the main competitive edge on the Western market. However, even this price competitiveness was to some extent artificial (Duponcel, 1997a ).
Needless to say, the food industry, as other industries, was strongly shaken by the transition process. Several sub-sectors found themselves in a situation of over-capacity almost overnight at the beginning of transition. This was triggered by the dramatic changes in the domestic and international demand for food products. Changes in domestic consumption were mainly provoked by the decline of consumers' real incomes in the first stages of the transition. As a result, the consumption of staple products and meats declined abruptly (Davis, 1997) .
Increased competition (from private domestic firms or from imports) and policies of product differentiation have also led to a decline in demand addressed to the poorly packaged and below quality standards products (e.g. canned products in Hungary).
Regarding changes in international demand, the main event was the loss of Eastern export markets as a result of the collapse of the CMEA and of the USSR. The damage was worse for those countries that has a strong export orientation to the USSR (Estonia and Hungary). As concerns Hungary, the CMEA represented about 40% of its food exports in the late 1980s. In this country, the sub-sectors that suffered most from the CMEA demise were poultry (exports of broiler chickens fell from 100,000 tons in 1990 to 10,000 tons in 1992), and fruit and vegetable canning industries (Duponcel, 1998) . This last sub-sector had developed a strong export capacity to the CMEA and most specifically to the USSR (about 60% of its output was exported to the CMEA by the end of the 1980s). These dramatic changes on the Eastern markets have been mitigated to some extent by the ability of the countries in transition to redirect part of their exports to Western Europe. However, the development of these exports was not re-direction proper since it only marginally concerned products formerly exported to the CMEA. So far, the development of exports to Western Europe has mainly relied on price competitiveness (Duponcel, 1997a) and has only marginally benefited from the limited opening of the EU market under the so-called Europe agreements (Duponcel, 1997c) .
The dramatic change of demand addressed to the food industry is only one of several factors that have triggered the restructuring of the whole sector. Fundamentally, the main factor has been privatisation. Many inefficiencies of the industry in ex-communist countries were direct or indirect outcomes of the crucial lack of real owners of the enterprises. Privatisation has therefore been a major part of the structural reforms that have been implemented in the economies of the CEEC-5.
Privatisation of the food industry in the CEEC-5

Choices for privatisation
The extensive literature about privatisation has shown that the technique chosen for carrying out privatisation of an enterprise can impact on its future performance and conduct. As we shall see later, privatisation of the food industry in the CEEC-5 has taken a variety of paths, according to the choices made by the government on the techniques of privatisation. Our aim in this section, is to review the privatisation process in the food industry of the CEEC-5 and, as far as possible, to single out the salient facts about the impact of the privatisation technique on the future performance of the privatised firms.
There is a rather large choice of privatisation techniques which are available to the policymaker. Hare (1994) proposes a comprehensive list of 10 items. Our purpose is not to present all of these possibilities but to select the most frequently used techniques in the food industries of the CEEC-5 and to review their respective advantages and defects. For the sake of simplification, we single out three main privatisation methods bearing in mind that actual privatisation can be a mix of these techniques:
1. Free (or almost free) distribution of shares/vouchers to the population (mass privatisation);
2.
Sale of shares (and often majority shares) to an outsider (core) investor (of national or foreign origin); and 3. Transfer of property to insiders (in general at preferential conditions).
We focus our interest on two aspects of privatisation: i) the possible impact on the corporate governance of the privatised firm and its performance, and ii) the possible impact on the supply of fresh capital.
Mass privatisation
Besides some political arguments such as equality among citizens in the privatisation process, mass privatisation with the free (or almost free) distribution of shares presents two main advantages. First it allows privatisation to proceed quickly. This is a decisive feature in a context of far-reaching reforms and a crucial requirement of industrial restructuring. It also makes the quick privatisation of unattractive industries (very large firms, firms in poor financial situation) easier. The second main advantage is that it can make up for the lack of domestic capacity to invest in the privatised firms.
However, this method of privatisation also presents major drawbacks. First, it does not generate any revenue for the State (nor to the privatised firm in the short term). This explains why Hungary, under strong pressure from the IMF to reduce its budget deficit, did not show significant interest in this method. Second, it can negatively impact on corporate governance if it leads to dispersed ownership. This explains why it is not the preferred theoretical model of privatisation. In that sense Marcinein and van Wijnbergen (1997) suggest the avoidance of privatisation through full voucherisation.
Sale of shares to outside strategic investors
Privatisation through the sale of shares has been commonly used in Western Europe over the last two decades. It was, however, more difficult to implement in Eastern Europe due to a lack of financial capacity in the economies of this region. Privatising that way implied the involvement of foreign capital to a significant extent. As we will see below, this was the main option pursued by Hungary. Bringing a core outside investor into the privatised firm should have significant advantages for improving the performance of the firm. From the point of view of the principal/agent theory, matters are clear with the owner theoretically able to impose its own views on the activity of the firm to the managers. Furthermore, an outside core investor is much more likely to bring along fresh capital and technological/managerial renewal than most other techniques of privatisation. If it is a foreign investor, such significant input is quasi systematic as the experience of countries in transition testifies. On the other hand, this method of privatisation requires time to be implemented and therefore might be seen as a brake to fast industrial restructuring. If it embodies significant levels of FDI, which is highly probable owing to the limited domestic financial capacity, it can stir up criticismlegitimate or not -that some elements of national wealth and success are left out of national control.
Buy-outs by insiders
Insider privatisation through buy-outs 1 is usually considered as having adverse consequences on the performance of the enterprise, not only because of a lack of capital available to the employees, but also because these schemes are not supposed to bring about the reshuffle necessary to increase performance. For instance, it can become difficult in an employee buyout (EBO) to adjust the workforce to efficiency standards, or to implement modern management techniques, etc. Limited capital availability is probably the most damaging aspect, although owners have, post-privatisation, the possibility of attracting outside capital.
This problem is often aggravated by the burden of acquisition debt (Bornstein, 1997) . As regards the supposed reluctance of insiders to cope with matters of efficiency, the common view seems to be a bit too simple. For instance, Bogetic (1993) argues that all-outsider privatisation should be avoided because some degree of internal agreement is necessary (hence minority share to insiders) and also because of informational asymmetry in favour of insiders. Besides this, he considers that ownership has to be concentrated in order to avoid principal/agent problems in a situation of strong uncertainty. Majority ownership has to be sought externally in order to avoid any labour-management type of enterprise functioning (as in former Yugoslavia).
Empirical work on the impacts of internal buy-outs on firms' performance has showed that in the initial post-privatisation years, investment levels were very low in Hungarian and Polish enterprises but, contrary to expectations, there were widespread reductions in employment and control of the real wage (Filatochev et al., 1996) . Further analysis also showed that the share of employee membership tends to decrease to the benefit of managers or outside ownership. According to another study, it seems clear that the performance of insider-owned firms is weaker than in enterprises with other private ownership (Frydman et al., 1997) .
However, a distinction must be made between employee-ownership and manager-ownership.
According to Frydman et al. (1997) , the performance of manager-owned enterprises would be better than the performance of employee-owned enterprises.
In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, MEBOs and EBOs have mainly concerned the sectors of trade, services and light industry (Bornstein, 1997 Frydman et al. (1997) , studying medium-sized private firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have concluded that investment funds are no less effective than "strategic" investors in revitalising firms. They also came to the conclusion that, in their sample, firms with FDI do not perform better than firms with domestic outsider ownership.
Main features of the privatisation of the food industry in the CEEC-5
As for the other sectors in Hungary, the main technique used to privatise the food industry was selling off the 138 SOEs with the involvement of foreign capital. This method was favoured by the different Governments mainly with the purpose of reimbursing foreign debt.
As domestic savings were limited, FDI had to contribute to the privatisation process. The very favourable judgements about the economic and political reform process along with good economic performance, allowed Hungary to attract strong FDI. As early as June 1993, 87 of the 138 SOEs in the food sector had been converted to companies, of which 41 were partially or totally private (Kiss, 1994 Holding Company decided to open privatisation to agricultural co-operatives and local government for 31 SOEs in a move towards completion of the privatisation process in the food sector. However, the total capital earmarked to be sold in this scheme against compensation vouchers was only 13 billion HUF (domestic capital that could be entered in the privatisation of the food industry amounted to about 110 billion HUF, EEA, March 1996). As the most profitable firms were privatised first, the agricultural producers could only enter the capital of primary processing firms. 2 However, as Table 2 clearly shows, producers have a very marginal share in the ownership structure of Hungarian agro-food companies.
This is a striking difference with other countries in transition and also with western market economies. In spite of a few attempts by the government to involve agricultural producers in the privatisation process, it turns out that the actual policy was to strongly favour outsiders (and particularly foreign capital) with large financial capacity. Capital was crucially lacking in the co-operatives of agricultural producers. The Czech Republic implemented an ambitious mass privatisation programme, through which most of the large SOEs were privatised in two waves (1992-93 and 1994-95) . Most of the food industries have been privatised through this programme (Commission of the EU, 1995a).
However, some of the large SOEs in the food sector have been privatised through EBOs.
This is the case of Budvar, of which 51% of the shares are supposed to be owned by the management (EEA, February 1997). However, internal buy-outs have not been favoured (Bornstein, 1997) . In the privatisation process, some 20% of the shares of the SOEs were reserved for agricultural producers, but according to Szabo (1997) , they later resold these shares, in most cases to foreign investors (e.g. in the dairy and sugar industries).
The Czech mass privatisation scheme has been quite successful owing to the development of investment funds which have enabled concentration of dispersed ownership. The ability of these investment funds to exercise their role as controller and conductor of the newly privatised firms has been questioned on different grounds. Their close links with banks and therefore the potential conflicts of interest have been pointed out as impediments to their effectiveness (e.g., OECD, 1996a; Commission of the EU, 1997). However, analyses of the performance of privatised firms in the Czech Republic (Claessens et al., 1996) tend to mitigate these points of view. They show that capital concentration is strong and that investment funds are particularly important in improving the performance of the firms (see Frydman et al., 1997) . Claessens et al. (1996) argue that industrial restructuring in the Czech
Republic has been faster than in other transition economies due to the clear ownership structures and the large influence of institutional investors on firms.
The privatisation of the food industry in Estonia was carried out for the most part during 1994-95. It was performed through the sale of assets in tenders or auctions or on the stock exchange, or through the bankruptcy procedure (Sepp, Loko, 1997) . The majority of shares were sold to core investors while the remaining shares were distributed to the population in exchange for vouchers but also for cash. As regards the food sector, exceptional provisions were set out for the state-owned grain mills, the dairy and meat industries (Article 32 of the law on privatisation). These provisions spelled out preferential treatment in buying assets
given to co-operatives in the agricultural sector. Firms privatised under Article 32 are reported to have performed badly mainly owing to a lack of capital to be invested by the cooperatives. This is particularly true in the meat and dairy sub-sectors (Sepp, Loko, 1997) .
Moreover, Article 32 had a deterent effect on foreign capital participation. In the other food sub-sectors, where this provision did not apply (brewing, confectionery, baking, tobacco), privatisation was carried out under the general provisions and received a very high level of interest from foreign investors. The food sector is the favourite target of FDI in Estonia (Commission, 1997).
In Poland, privatisation has proceeded much more slowly than in the other CEEC-5. 3 Due to Poland's limited creditworthiness until 1994-95, privatisation had to rely mainly on domestic ownership (Gomulka, 1998) . It was carried out in three ways 4 (OECD, 1996b): i) direct privatisation of small and medium enterprises; ii) open sale of shares and search for a strategic outside investor (so-called "capital privatisation"); and iii) mass privatisation. In the first case, insider ownership could gain the upperhand over outsider ownership, and, indeed, as Estrin (1996) points out, MEBOS have been an important element of Polish privatisation. This stems mainly from the effective power given to workers prior to the transition. In the case of capital privatisation, a number of cases have involved FDI, mainly since 1994-95. As regards effective governance, surveys cited by the OECD (1996b) conclude that the most impressive improvement of firms' performance was observed in the case of capital privatisation, and more particularly when it involved FDI (although, quite often the strategic investor could not directly acquire a majority share).
While in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary privatisation of the core food sector could be considered as complete in 1997, in Poland it had almost not considered such branches as grain, meat, vegetable oil (of the 13 oil refineries in Poland, two had FDI and four were still in state hands in 1996), tobacco, fruit and vegetables, wine, beer, foodstuffs (EEA, October 1997). In 1997, privatisation plans in the food sector concerned sugar industries (4 enterprises) and spirits (21 enterprises). Privatisation is complete only in the poultry, confectionery, food concentrates, alcohol and sugar sectors.
In Slovenia, the privatisation of socially owned enterprises has been a lengthy and incomplete process. It has been a mixture of insider privatisation, voucher privatisation and other techniques of privatisation. The Law on Ownership Transformation granted a large scope of initiative for the enterprises to propose their own privatisation plans. According to the OECD (1997), by the end of 1996, two thirds of the privatised firms were under insider control.
However, large enterprises favoured other options of privatisation as they were too expensive for internal buy-out. It turns out that strategic investors control only a limited number of enterprises. The second largest group of owners, besides the insiders, is made up of institutions (investment funds, pension funds, etc.). The impact of privatisation in terms of corporate governance on the large firms is still not clear, as ownership rights are dispersed in three groups of owners (insiders, institutions, and individuals). At least in the small firms, the prominence of insiders is obvious. Under-capitalisation in a number of these firms should be a common outcome of the priority given to internal buy-outs. As concerns the food industry, privatisation of the socially owned firms has been mainly carried out through MBOs with explicit restrictions to foreign portfolio participation (Erjavec et al., 1998) . Privatisation is complete only in the fruit and vegetable processing industry, the sugar industry and in the animal feed industry (see Table 3 ). Source: Slovene agency for privatisation, quoted in Erjavec et al. (1998) .
Cross sectional general features
The privatisation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the food sector have favoured insider ownership in all the CEEC-5 (with the possible exception of Hungary). In addition to this, agricultural producers (individuals, private companies, new style co-operatives) who have a direct interest in the selling and processing of their products have also been granted access to ownership. Typically, these enterprises are most numerous in the first processing product chains such as dairies, meat processing plants, etc. However they lack fresh capital and do not reach the critical size (small market share) to interest any outsider (e.g. FDI). They sell mainly on local markets for basic non-differentiated products (e.g. fresh milk). They are often unable to develop and sell branded products at the national level and quite a few of them could go bust along with the restructuring process.
As regards large enterprises, insiders or agricultural producers have only occasionally been favoured in the privatisation in Hungary, the Czech Republic and also Poland. In Estonia, producers have been given the priority in the first processing industries (meat industry, dairies and mills). This has had deterrent effects on FDI. In Slovenia, insiders have clearly been favoured and FDI explicitly rejected apart from a few sub-sectors (e.g. in the sugar industry).
Foreign direct investment in the food industry of the CEEC-5
Studies of industrial competitiveness in Central and Eastern European countries report that the food industry was among the worst performing at the beginning of the transition towards full-fledged market economies (e.g. in the case of Hungary: Michael et al., 1993) . The food industries crucially lacked the resources necessary to modernise their obsolete physical assets and production processes. If restructuring had relied only on domestic capital, it would have been a very protracted process on the whole. Therefore, the main impetus for the modernisation of the food industry was bound to come from abroad, at least in the mid-term.
In such circumstances, whether government policies were FDI "friendly" or more or less reluctant to encourage foreign participation would be likely to have a strong impact on the performance of the sector. Contrary to the expectations of many observers, based on the bad performance of the industry, the food sector has actually attracted significant amounts of FDI, and, in quite a few of the transition countries, succeeded in being the favourite target of foreign investors. Motivations for foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe have been extensively investigated and we now have quite a clear picture of the main ones (Markowski, Jackson, 1994; Genco et al., 1993; Meyer, 1995) . The first reason is penetration of a new market and securing a market share. Aspects related to low production costs (labour, etc.) appear to be of secondary significance, contrary to theoretical expectations. The analysis of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe indicates that the food sector has been particularly attractive. The main explanations are probably that there is firm and assured demand for food products in domestic markets and protection from imports are often significant in this sector.
As quoted in Meyer (1995), "acquisition gives comparably easy access to a significant market share and creates high barriers to entry which will deter new entrants". However, in countries like Estonia and Slovenia with small domestic markets, the market share is probably not of high significance for the foreign investor. In the case of Estonia, considerations of foreign trade are probably more important (namely as a foothold to the huge market of Russia). (1) The companies surveyed were asked to rank the importance of each reason. The points range from 0 (minimum) to 3 (maximum). Source: Genco et al. (1993) .
As concerns Hungary, foreign firms are particularly present in services, the machinery and the food processing industries. The food sector has attracted 28% of the total FDI to the manufacturing sector (Commission, 1997). A study commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture (see EEA, May 1997) reported that at the end of the privatisation programme of the 138 SOEs, 53% of all capital in the food industry was foreign owned. As shown in Table   5 , Hungary turns out to be an exception amongst the CEEC-5 as regards the participation of FDI in the whole food sector.
In the Czech Republic, the food sector has attracted 7% of total FDI. It has taken time to come because priority was given to privatisation rather than attracting FDI (Commission of the EU, 1995a). When compared to Hungary and Poland, the level achieved by the Czech Republic appears rather low. According to figures provided by Josling et al. (1997) , FDI stock in the food industry of the Czech Republic at the end of 1996 amounted to less than half the stock of FDI in Romania.
FDI is very low in Slovenia's industry and in the food sector in particular. According to the EU Commission (1997), this can be explained by i) the small size of the Slovenian domestic market, ii) the general uncertainty about the future of the former Yugoslavia and iii) tight controls and restrictions on FDI and incomplete legal framework. As already mentioned, the privatisation of the socially-owned enterprises was mainly carried out through MBOs with clear limits stipulated on foreign capital.
Poland did not attract sizeable amounts of FDI until 1995 when its international financial credibility improved significantly with the signing of an agreement on foreign debt with private creditors in late 1994 (Gomulka, 1998) . However, significant foreign capital has come to the Polish food sector as shown in Table 5 .
In Estonia, FDI is significant in sub-sectors privatised under the general provisions of the Law on Privatisation (for which Article 32 does not apply). Foreign investors have had a strong interest in brewing, confectionery, tobacco and baking. According to Commission of the EU (1997), the food industry is the favourite target of FDI in Estonia. Investments come mainly from neighbouring countries such as Sweden and Finland.
FDI has not entered all food sub-sectors. Investment has been directed to the most profitable ones. This excluded -at least in the initial years -the enterprises, which had developed a strong, export orientation to the CMEA (e.g. poultry, pig meat in Hungary) which suddenly experienced a huge production over-capacity. The privatisation of the enterprises, which did not go bankrupt, has been particularly difficult. FDI has also, as a rule, discarded such primary processing sub-sectors where branding is not decisive and where there were no state monopolies (e.g. such as the sugar industry) (Trail, 1997) . The difficulties in buying significant market shares in some sub-sectors (such as meat, baking industries) probably explain to some extent the low levels of FDI in these sub-sectors (Trail, 1997) . Moreover, these sub-sectors are also the ones where price structures do not immediately allow us to forecast clear-cut profitability. Primary processing industries face a kind of barrier of food demand (Pouliquen, 1997) . Food demand, and food prices, are constrained by the households' disposable incomes, and the necessity to contain inflation. All this, combined with an observed rise of the margins of wholesale and retail markets, does not favour the increase of margins for staple products industries. 5 This constraint is much weaker in sub-sectors producing more elaborated, and differentiated, products such as confectionery, beverages, branded dairy products, etc. Finally, it might also be argued that foreign investors prefer to invest in industries where interactions with local agricultural producers are not significant (Meyer, 1995) . 
Industrial structures
Some theoretical background and general remarks
"A competitive market is seen as contributing to total economic welfare by restraining price increases, encouraging firms to minimise costs and promoting an efficient allocation of resources" (OECD, 1996c). Porter (1990) considers that the performance of an industry depends on a strong competition policy. This was experienced a contrario by the CEEC-5 under the communist regime: the total lack of competition and the organisation of most industries in monopolies led to very poor performances and subsequently urgent needs to restructure them when transition started.
Whether industrial and market structure is conducive to proper functioning of the market is a multidimensional question which depends, to some extent, on the very nature of the industrial branch under investigation. Hence, the need for enforcement of strict de-monopolisation and competition policies can vary according to the specific features of the various economic sectors and of the considered markets. Namely it depends on the following factors (among others):
• Significance of the size effect on the economic performance of enterprises. Demonopolisation should not lead to market structures with undersized enterprises in the sectors where economies of scale (and economies of scope) are decisive. In this, the present limited size of the domestic market of several central European countries has to be taken into account, a well as the very large size of the market in which the CEEC-5 will be immersed once they become members of the EU;
• The nature of firms in the sector considered. If they are large non-restructured SOEs, breaking up should probably allow them to operate more efficiently. If they are already truly private firms, consideration of the impact of any merging (in terms of profitability of the firm but also of consumer and social welfare) would have to take account of the market structure and of the size of the firm (see below); • The nature of demand that the firms face. The less elastic the demand it faces, the more potential market power the firm has (Perloff, Sun, 1997);
• Level of openness of the economy. In protected sectors (such as in the food sphere), appropriate competition policy could be considered as decisive since foreign companies have limited possibility to compete on the domestic market. On this issue, it has to be kept in mind that all considered countries are would-be members of the EU and therefore will experience totally free trade of agro-food products, within the EU market, in the long-term. Since the beginning of transition, the competitive pressure has probably been higher for the processed food products than for staple agricultural products (see European Economy, 1997, page 14) .
• Barriers to entry and to exit of the market. The lower the barriers, i.e. the more the market is contestable, the lower the necessity to enforce strong competition/demonopolisation regulations. As concerns countries in transition, the barriers of entry could be considered at rather low levels at the start of reforms, compared to market economies, for the following reasons: i) the inherited monopolies were mainly endowed with outdated or obsolete technology, while new competitors were more likely to have modern production capital. This made it difficult for the monopolies to threaten lower post-entry prices (van Siclen, 1993) ; ii) consumer markets were not highly differentiated, branded products were rather scarce at the beginning of the transition 7 ;
• Significance of foreign direct investment. Quite often, the strong financial backing of Western firms allows them to buy industries (i.e. market shares) at rather low prices compared to standards in fully-fledged market economies. In so doing, these firms can implement strategies of increasing entry costs and undermine true competition. In Hungary, the president of the Competition Office announced that as a result of a lack of 7 It could even be argued that consumer products originating from the SOEs faced a negative reputation in their own market and suffered a lack of image compared to new products (either imported or produced by new private companies). The market share of the former firms could be mainly asserted through pricing.
co-ordination between privatisation and de-monopolisation, foreign firms had been able to monopolise portions of the cement, sugar, building materials and vegetable oil industries through investment in dominant firms (Slay, 1995) . He considered that FDI had contributed to the de-monopolisation in cigarettes, soft drinks, and confectionery products; it had exacerbated monopoly problems in other industrial branches; • In the case of merger, the actual situation of both entities has to be carefully taken into consideration. When the alternative of merger is the liquidation of one of the entities (frequent cases in the CEEC-5), economic considerations can take the upper hand to a strict enforcement of the competition law; • In the case of the food industry, it is crucial to equally take into account monopsony/oligopsony power because food enterprises deal with a high number of raw materials suppliers, a context which is probably typical of the sector. Delays in privatisation and de-monopolisation were considered as reasons for the price-cost squeeze the farm sector experienced at the start of transition (Szabo, 1997) . It could be argued that if primary producers have been totally neglected in the privatisation process, as happened in Hungary, scrutiny of the public agencies in charge of market functioning would be of primary significance to prevent the occurrence of monopsony or oligopsony market power which might be damaging for agricultural producers.
When reviewing impacts of imperfect competition on welfare, several aspects have to be taken into consideration: i) market dominance and abuse of market dominance, ii) cartelisation, iii) mergers and acquisitions. As concerns cartelisation, it is clear that it has harmful effects on both consumers and producers (McCorriston, Sheldon, 1997) . Whether dominance position and mergers and acquisition have positive or harmful impacts is more of a case by case issue since it relies on the behaviour of the firm itself. If economies of scale are significant in the considered sector, a dominance might as well have positive effects such as lower production costs and higher competitiveness. Most of the CEEC-5 have small inner markets, which means for domestic firms that attaining the critical size for taking advantage of the economies of scale-scope possibly means reaching dominant positions. There seems to be a consensus shared by most competition agencies in the OECD countries that, under certain circumstances, the overall improvements of efficiency may permit mergers and acquisitions in the food sector which may have anti-competitive effects (OECD, 1996c) . This consensus also exists in some of the CEEC-5 competition agencies (e.g. in Czech Republic, in Hungary where mergers and acquisitions are quite numerous in the food sector). However, the same OECD study quotes empirical analyses which question the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions improve efficiency.
As for other industrial sectors, the food industry was highly concentrated under the socialist regime. For instance, 75% of food production in Hungary came from 138 large SOEs at the end of the 1980s (Duponcel, 1997) , while in Czechoslovakia, the entire food sector was comprised of only 89 SOEs (OECD, 1995) . In Poland, 196 firms (Cave, Estrin, 1993) provided 80% of the food production.
Structural policies implemented in the CEEC-5: break-up first rather than privatise first
If we try to sequence the policies implemented by the Governments of the CEEC-5 and the actual outcomes in the field of restructuring/privatisation, we can propose the following:
1.
Breaking-up of some of the monopolies in the last years of the communist regime (e.g.
in Hungary 8 ) and at the beginning of the transition (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic).
De-monopolisation has been strong in Poland (Commission, 1995a) and in the Czech Republic (Perloff, Sun, 1997) .
De-concentration has generally been carried out before privatisation by splitting up the monopolies at the regional levels (dairy, grain, meat sub-sectors, etc.). The regional organisation of most monopolies in the former period was to some extent peculiar to the food industry. It stemmed from the dispersed structure of agricultural production.
This probably explains the fact that de-monopolisation has probably been stronger in the food industry in most CEEC-5 than in the other industrial sectors.
2.
The privatisation of the food industries. De-monopolisation prior to privatisation has been disregarded in a few instances, but this is rather exceptional. As concerns Hungary, the monopoly in vegetable oil has been transferred to a private monopoly (Cereol). In the food sector, focus seems to have been directed to both structural questions (de-concentration) and issues of conduct (anti-cartel and dominant firm questions). As regards Hungary and Poland this appears to be peculiar to the food sector since for the other industries, the reverse was usually the case (Slay, 1995) .
Evolution of concentration of the food industry in the CEEC-5
When assessing market power one generally uses concentration measures such as C4 9 or
Herfindal indexes. The calculation of such indicators was not possible owing to the limited data at our disposal. However, looking at the evolution of numbers of enterprises can provide a rough appreciation of the shifts of the industrial structures as argued by Slay (1995) although it is not free from shortcomings 10 (see McCorriston, Sheldon, 1997). Source: Statistical yearbooks of Hungary (1994 Hungary ( , 1996 . (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) Source: Erjavec et al. (1998) .
In order to make preliminary comparisons between countries, we adjust all figures to domestic markets of 10 million inhabitants (we multiply the actual figures by 5 for Slovenia and 6.66 for Estonia, and divide by 3.8 for Poland), results are presented in Table 10 . From Table 10 we can immediately divide the CEEC-5 into two groups. Estonia and Hungary present relatively high levels of concentration, at least compared to the other CEEC-5. In
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, the industrial structures appear to be more fragmented, as also reckoned in the literature on the matter.
Increasing numbers of enterprises in all countries ... Tables 6 to 10 show that the number of enterprises involved in food processing have increased in all countries for which data were available. Despite the limits of the measure, it can certainly be considered that the food industry has experienced a de-concentration in the countries under investigation. However, it is clearly apparent that it has not had the same effect in all sub-sectors. De-concentration is the highest in sub-sectors where economies of scale are not significant and entry costs are low, such as the bakery sub-sector (low capital costs and high product turnover). This concerns also, but to a much lower extent, confectionery, dairy and meat processing sub-sectors where entry costs where probably low at the beginning of transition. In such sub-sectors as vegetable oil or sugar, where both entry costs and economies of scale are significant, no real de-concentration has taken place.
Industrial concentration appears to be the highest in Hungary. The level of concentration in some sub-sectors has already raised concerns about competition conditions (e.g. Commission 1995a; Szabo, 1997) : in those sub-sectors, the capital is either of foreign origin -e.g., the vegetable oil industry was entirely sold to a single foreign company (the French-Dutch Cereol), the sugar industry is dominated by a handful of foreign companies -or of domestic origin (e.g. poultry, meat and milling industries). The following sub-sectors have C4 ratios above 75%: vegetable oil, starch, beer, soft drinks, cigarettes, sugar (Szabo, 1997) . Although these high levels of concentration should enable firms to reach critical size, their behaviour has already been questioned and punished several times. The sugar industries have been fined for cartel behaviour in 1993 at the expense of consumers (they simultaneously increased their prices). A case is currently under the scrutiny of the Competition Office for cartel behaviour at the expense of sugar beet producers (EEA, 1998) . Although this issue of concentration (and especially concentration in foreign hands) is highly sensitive in Hungary, no overall study has yet been carried out in order to assess its impact on the efficiency of food production, competitiveness and social welfare.
Levels of concentration in Estonia appear to be rather similar to those of Hungary, with the notable exception of the dairy sub-sector which is highly fragmented.
In the Czech Republic, 11 Poland and Slovenia, the levels of concentration are low. Poland is probably the country where structures are the most fragmented. Of course, these levels of concentration vary across sub-sectors. In Poland, about 24,000 firms were active in the food sector in 1995, of which only 900 employed more than 900 persons (Viane, Gellynck, 1997) .
This results from the de-monopolisation process and the creation of a host of small and medium-sized enterprises. Clearly, in a number a sub-sectors, mainly in the first processing stage, the small size of the enterprises undermines their competitiveness (lack of investment, lack of funds for research and development, etc.) and does not allow them to reap benefits of potential economies of scale (Commission, 1995a; Szabo, 1997; Viane, Gellynck, 1997) .
However, this picture has to be mitigated by the fact that the food sector features 90 of the 500 largest Polish enterprises (Commission of the EU, 1997). This suggests that the structure of the food industry is highly polarised.
...But some evidence of re-concentration processes
As already mentioned, concentration tends to be highest in the sectors where entry barriers are highest. Such sectors where the strategies of product differentiation are significant (often under the impetus of foreign owned companies) are difficult to enter, especially for domestic capital. This concerns highly processed products such as beverages, etc. Where barriers to entry are low, concentration is also low because numerous entrants have often been able to enter the market (bakeries, milk processing industry, etc.) quite often as a result of the privatisation of state assets (e.g. in Poland), but not necessarily. However, even in the dairy industry, entry costs are currently pushed upwards in a country like Hungary as a result of the strategies of the biggest firms which develop strong branded products in specific segments of the market (Danone on fruit yoghurts, Parmalat on long life milk, Besnier on cheeses, etc., see Szabo, 1997 12 ). Potential entrants need therefore to develop their own brands and large financial capacities to step in, which quasi-automatically excludes domestic entrepreneurs.
Otherwise, they are compelled to specialise in the segments of the market where product differentiation is low, i.e. in first processing stage, and profitability is severely constrained.
The situation is probably different in the dairy industry of the other CEEC-5 although the same tendencies should be observed in the medium term. In Poland, the number of dairy firms is high (420 in 1996 according to Przepiora, McLeay, 1997) and their processing capacity low by western European standards. The number of dairies in the Czech Republic is also much higher than in Hungary (see Table 10 ).
It seems clear that the process of concentration is also stirred up in the sub-sectors where foreign investors play a significant role. This is obvious in the case of the Hungarian food industry: processes of merging and concentration are a direct outcome of the strong foreign presence which in turn forces enterprises with domestic capital to adopt similar strategies in order to be able to keep pace and stay in the market. This dynamic process of merging, which is not limited to Hungary, looks all the more impressive than in western Europe, it is a phenomenon which only started in the mid-1980s (mergers and acquisitions started much earlier in the USA).
Anecdotal evidence of the current process of re-concentration of some food branches in some of the CEEC-5 is taken from information compiled in various issues of East Europe
Agriculture and Food (referred as EEA).
As already mentioned, industrial concentration in Czech Republic is low. However, in some sub-sectors, the concentration is high. The Czech beer market is dominated by three major breweries (EEA, August 1997) which have about 51% share of the market, and concentration is also on going with significant merging projects (EEA, December 1997). In the sugar subsector, the Anti-monopoly Office approved the merger of two firms (one with French capital).
The new company will hold about 50% of the whole Czech sugar output (EEA, January 1998).
Concentration is dynamic in Hungary:
• In the sugar industry, four major groups shared the market with three of them with majority foreign capital (Eridiana Beghin-Say, Easter Sugar and Agrana) until 1997.
The fourth group was domestically owned but was reported in the end of 1996 on the verge of bankruptcy. It was eventually bought by Agrana, which then weighted more than half Hungarian market, 13 after approval of the Hungarian Competition Office;
• Concentration is also increasing in the dairy market (Szabo, Toth, 1997) . From 1995 to 1996, the joint share of the four market leaders grew from 26.5 to 30.6% only by internal growth. Two mergers in 1997 have pushed the C4 ratio beyond 40% (Szabo, Toth, 1997 ). Yet, it is considered that there are still too many dairy processing firms in Hungary, the average size of which is low by EU standards; • Concentration is also increasing in the confectionery sub-sector with increasing market shares of the four present multinationals (Stollwerck, Nestlé Hungaria, United biscuits, Jacobs Suchards). Four foreign owned companies were considered to control almost 80% of Hungarian domestic biscuit sales in 1995 (EEA, March 1997); • In the canning industry, two big companies (Globus Rt and Deko Rt) were reported to merge. The new company would have about 25-30% domestic market share (EEA, 13 Agrana subsequently closed one of its newly acquired plants in 1998 and sold two plants to an association between Tate and Lyle and Générale Sucrière (EEA, December 1997).
April 1998). Bonduelle, a French company, holds a 40% of the sweet corn market in Hungary.
In some of these sub-sectors, industries enjoy comfortable levels of protection (import surcharges for confectionery products, for dairy products, strong protection of the sugar market).
CEEC-5 food industries and accession to the EU: achievements and way ahead
Part of restructuring is still ahead
Privatisation is over in the CEEC-5, with the exception of Poland. A good deal of restructuring has taken place with the bankruptcies procedures and after privatisation by the new owners. However advanced, restructuring and rationalisation is not finished in the subsectors of first stage processing of agricultural produce. For instance, the over-capacity of the Hungarian canning industry is still considered to be at a level of 25-35% (EEA, January 1998). Such high levels of over-capacity are not limited to the Hungarian canning industry but concern most primary food industries in the CEEC-5 (Szabo, 1997) . This clearly shows that there is still a good deal of restructuring work ahead.
By contrast, it could be argued that restructuring is more or less complete in the further processing stages sub-sectors. The reasons are quite obvious. First, no high levels of overcapacity have been observed in these sub-sectors since transition: no strong export orientation to the CMEA had been developed under the communist regime, except for particular subsectors, and the contraction of domestic demand has been less dramatic than for some staple products. Second, these sub-sectors have attracted significant amounts of FDI and could be privatised without major difficulties, which speeded up their restructuring. Their capacity to better attract FDI can be explained by the technique of privatisation (see Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary for meat and poultry, etc.), the fact that primary processing industries were much less attractive (often plagued with excess capacity, etc.), the greater the voice granted to agricultural producers in sub-sectors close to production, etc. Natural monopolies have been quite easily restructured almost always with FDI (even in Slovenia the sugar industry has been sold to foreign investors, Erjavec et al., 1998) . Source: Duponcel (1997c) . Table 12 gives an overview of the numbers of food firms in CEEC-5 which are licensed to export to the EU. The firms that appear to have the highest standards, as measured by the level of licenses for export to the EU are in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The first two countries are traditional exporters to the EU and, therefore, have a core of enterprises with adequate standards. The Czech Republic and Estonia appear to be lagging behind in raising their standards to the EU levels.
The necessity of upgrading quality and hygiene standards in most candidates to accession is still very strong, even in the most advanced countries. In Poland, considerable investment is needed to upgrade facilities such as abattoirs (Commission of the EU, 1997), and the situation is far from satisfactory in the dairy industry as the ban on milk imports temporarily imposed by the EU for sanitary reasons in 1998 testifies.
Diverging paths on the road to the EU
From our analysis, a few tentative propositions about the future performance of the food industries of the CEEC-5 in the EU market may be offered. As our review relies on partial data and partial analysis (we have not analysed the actual performance of the food industry), our comments on the possible performance of the food industry in the EU market should be considered with care. However, they take extensive account of the literature published on the matters considered.
The food sectors of Hungary and Estonia are probably those which should perform the best in the wider EU. In both countries, these sectors feature advantages relative to the other CEEC-5. Privatisation has privileged the sale of firms to strategic, and often foreign, investors. FDI has hugely participated in the renewal of production capacity and has significantly increased competition in most of the sub-sectors it has entered. Market structures are more conducive to production efficiency in both countries than in the three others with comparatively higher levels of concentration and therefore better sized enterprises. This does not mean however, that these firms have already reached the average size of food firms in the EU. While Table 10 shows that the dairy sub-sector is the most concentrated in Hungary, the Hungarian dairies are still small compared to EU standards. According to Szabo and Toth (1997) , the biggest Hungarian dairy processed about 155 million litres of milk in 1995 while in the EU more than half of all milk is processed by larger firms. According to the same authors, there would be 14 EU companies which are larger than the whole Hungarian dairy industry.
While Hungarian food industries still benefit from substantial border protection and support on the export side, Estonian firms are developing in a liberal environment, largely unprecedented in Europe (no export subsidies, almost no trade protection, etc.). Therefore, when entering the EU market, most of them should not face major adaptation problems.
Slovenia's food industry will probably face the biggest difficulties to adapt to its future EU environment. The structure of its industry is highly fragmented. Restructuring has not been facilitated by a privatisation procedure which privileged insiders and disregarded foreign direct investment. Privatisation itself is not completed. Moreover, the Slovenian food industry benefits from the highest trade protection among the CEEC-5 and thus far is more or less sheltered from the competition it is bound to experience in mid-term once in the EU market.
Poland and Czech Republic do not present such striking features as in any of the three above-mentioned countries. In both countries, industrial structures are fragmented, at least in some sub-sectors. This has a strong negative effect on the performance of the sector. Higher concentration levels would allow taking advantage of the economies of scale and would significantly increase productivity levels. Poland received significant amounts of FDI, though comparatively less than Hungary. The Czech Republic did not lure as many foreign investors.
Although the food industry was partly privatised through a mass privatisation scheme in both countries (at least the large enterprises), both countries seem to have been able to avoid the caveats of this technique of privatisation on corporate governance. According to the EU Commission (1997), the food industry is one of the most dynamic of Polish industry and would have already achieved international competitiveness. However, one has to distinguish, in this judgement, the primary processing industry and the further stage processing industry.
Moreover, this competitiveness is still based upon cost advantages and relatively marginally on non-price competitiveness and strategies of product differentiation. However, it is likely that the significant FDI directed at the Polish food sector will exert a strong pressure towards this kind of strategy. The fragmented structures and inefficiencies of the agricultural sector are also major bottlenecks to the efficiency of the primary processing industry in Poland.
Although incomplete, our structural analysis has highlighted the main features of the different paths followed by the CEEC-5 in the privatisation and the restructuring of their food industries. Initial decisions on these matters will have significant impacts on the future performance of the enterprises. However, as previously mentioned, the fate of the private firms does not only depend on these initial stages of privatisation. Ownership structures can evolve, industrial restructuring will continue through mergers and bankruptcies. The paper has pointed out the role of FDI as a leading restructuring force. In most countries, industrial concentration is likely to take place and appears necessary given the limited size of most of the CEEC-5 domestic markets. This process has to be accompanied with clear competition regulations and policies in order to strengthen the competitive ability of the firms, and to prepare them for the EU single market.
